Oil Fueled Murder - Solved by the Barrel
Part One of a Two-Part Substack
The Wyatt Oil Theft
On Thursday, October 2, 1980, during the late-night hours, a small group of thieves utilized stolen keys to enter the Wyatt Oil Tank Farm in Hamden, Connecticut. Heavily armed, they were prepared to maintain control of the site for several hours or use their weapons to facilitate their escape. During their time on the site, they activated the loading dock pumps to facilitate the loading process of a fleet of tanker trucks, making multiple trips to steal approximately a quarter of a million gallons of home heating oil valued at $500,000.
Looking at the 1980 oil theft through 2025 colored glasses:
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA.gov), the price of a gallon of home heating oil for the week of 3/03/25, in Connecticut was $3.748 excluding taxes, therefore 250,000 gallons would be valued at $970,000 today.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, and Inflation Calculator, $500,000 would equal $1,885,607.31 in today’s dollars.
During loading, the thieves opened the wrong valve on a holding tank, causing gallons of #2 oil to overflow into a smaller tank faster than it could be off-loaded. Oil spewed from an overflow pipe, leading to a strong smell throughout the neighborhood that prompted 911 calls.
When the police arrived early on Friday, October 3rd, two thieves prepared for a potential confrontation by drawing their weapons. One carried a .45 caliber, Mac10-type machine gun with an attached silencer, while the other had a 1911 model .45 caliber pistol.
A third thief approached the situation differently. He informed police officers that the price of home heating oil was set to rise on Monday, prompting the Oil company to extend its business hours so local dealers could stock up before the increase. This explanation had some success, the responding officers believed the story. However, rather than leaving they stayed to help. A police officer began directing traffic, facilitating the movement of tanker trucks from the main street to the narrower streets around the tank farm. The officer also noted a logo on one of the tanker trucks, which later led to the arrest of two drivers, lower-level co-conspirators, within a day or two.
Perry Farnham
Perry Farnham ran an environmental cleanup business in New Haven, Connecticut. He cooperated with the police regarding the Wyatt Oil theft after some of his trucks were taken without permission and used in the crime. Farnham received warnings to stay silent about what he knew directly from individuals involved in the crime and through their intermediaries.
One Friday night, about two weeks before Christmas 1980, he was shot to death. An employee returning late from an oil spill cleanup found him dead on the concrete floor of the garage bay—his body lying next to one of his tanker trucks.
Nobody saw the shooters, but there was plenty of physical evidence: fired bullets and cartridge cases. A series of bullets was recovered from one of the garage bay walls and more were later removed from Farnham’s body during the autopsy. Expended cartridge cases littered the garage bay floor and were also collected.
Two firearms were used in the killing. A .45 caliber autoloading pistol delivered multiple shots to the victim’s chest and midsection. In a symbolic “coup de grâce”—a final series of shots to the head fired from a .380 caliber pistol – confirmed the intended message– you talk – you die.
The evidence, including the brass on the floor, was sent to the New Haven PD, Ballistics Unit for examination. There experts examined the unique markings left on the recovered fired ammunition components.
Forensic Intelligence
When a firearm is discharged, the components—bullets and cartridge cases—come into forced contact with some of the gun’s internal surfaces. The nature of the contact is such that the manufacturing marks left on certain internal working parts of the firearm, become imprinted into the softer surfaces of the bullets and cartridge cases when the gun is fired.
These internal ballistic markings can tell a story, and what a story they told in this case. Over the next several days, the Ballistics Units of the New Haven PD and the ATF National Laboratory provided a wealth of information.
All .45 auto caliber cartridge cases collected were of the same brand. This was noteworthy because a survey of high-volume firearm dealers in Connecticut determined that it was not a brand they stocked.
Forensic examinations of fired bullets and cartridge cases pointed to the type of murder weapons. One was likely an RPB Industries, model SM-10, .45 Auto/ACP pistol, similar to the MAC-10 submachine gun. The other was a Beretta Model 70S, .380 caliber pistol. The RPB pistol could be converted to a fully automatic machine gun with simple modifications. This fact, coupled with a crime scene photo in the local paper the next morning, depicting the telltale staccato pattern of the bullet holes in the garage bay wall, piqued the interest of a local ATF Agent – invited in by his local PD counterparts he opened a federal firearms investigation in support of the ongoing state murder case.
ATF firearm experts in Washington, D.C., would add an interesting piece to the puzzle: from the rifling marks on the bullets, they would conclude that the murder weapon was one of about three thousand that had been made after RPB Industries began using a newly designed pistol barrel in the model SM-10 pistol about three months before the shooting.
Evidence-led Actionable Intelligence
The barrel change led to an investigative strategy to identify all RPB model SM-10 .45 Auto/ACP pistols with the new barrel design shipped to Connecticut during the 3 months in question.
Considering only 3,000 guns were made during the period, how many might have been sold in a small State like Connecticut?
The ATF Agent in New Haven requested that an agent in the Atlanta ATF office conduct a records search at RPB Industries' primary distributor in Georgia. The goal was to identify any RPB pistols with the new barrel design from that batch of 3,000 that were shipped to Connecticut before the Farnham murder. Agents would then try to determine which if any of those guns had ties to the Farnham murder.
A snowstorm impacted New Haven on a Saturday morning when ATF Atlanta called with the information they had found - three guns had been sent to a Connecticut dealer within the specified timeline.
An hour later, a New Haven Detective Sergeant picked up his ATF partner from his home. With chains on their tires, they traveled to speak to the gun dealer in Ansonia, located along the Naugatuck River, approximately 12 miles northwest of New Haven.
The gun dealer ran his firearm business from his home office. When requested by the ATF Agent, he provided his "A & D Book," which dealers used to record their firearm acquisitions and dispositions related to their federal firearms license (FFL).
The Agent opened the ledger, and a stack of invoices fell out. They were for 4 cases of .45 Auto caliber ammunition, the same brand found at the Farnham murder scene. It was also the same brand recommended by RPB Industries for use in the SM-10 pistol. Reviewing the gun dealer’s A&D book, the Agent noted entries for three RPB pistols identified by ATF Atlanta, along with the names of the purchasers.
The agent suppressed a “gotcha grin”, as he became convinced that he and the sergeant were in the right place - led there by the scratches and dents left on the brass on the floor.
Some Lessons Learned
For me, the Farnham Case demonstrated the importance of approaching firearm-related crimes with the presumption that every crime gun and piece of ballistic evidence can provide valuable information for solving and preventing violent crimes. Police and forensic agencies that use this approach have been notably successful in handling firearm-related violent crime.
While this lesson may have been difficult to sustain in 1980 because much of the tedious and time-consuming work had to be done manually, advances in science and technology allow us to extract crime-solving information more efficiently and effectively today.
Automated Ballistic Identification Systems (ABIS) and ballistic data sharing networks such as the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, managed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), are widely available today.
"Forensics" and "crime scene investigation" are now common terms, reflecting our increased reliance on various forensic techniques. Moreover, the fusion of forensic and other types of intelligence related to firearm crimes has led to what is now commonly called Crime Gun Intelligence (CGI).
So, why is comprehensive CGI still not pursued diligently and systematically in many places today, even where advanced tools are available? One common refrain I hear is, “We don’t have the resources.”
A few different mindsets can help overcome this belief and get things moving.
You need the desire. When you truly want it, you'll find a way. If your car breaks down, you find a way to fix it. If a hurricane drops a tree on your roof, you fix it. We adapt to adversity in our private lives - why not also in our professional lives?
Developing a leader, champion, or strong advocate for comprehensive CGI can create awareness and get things moving.
Balance your people, processes, and technology like a three-legged stool. To examine every crime committed with a gun and all related ballistic evidence, you must maintain equilibrium among these three elements.
Sam Houston State University's study, Testing the Effects of People, Processes, and Technology on Ballistic Evidence Processing Productivity showed that the Stockton Police Department’s Firearms Unit increased productivity by finding the right mix of people, processes, and technology.
This balancing requires a collaborative effort of thought and action with representatives from three key stakeholder groups: the police, forensics, and prosecutors.
TO BE CONTINUED IN PART 2: THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND MORE LESSONS LEARNED