In June 2013, I was in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with the Justice Education Society (JES) of Vancouver, BC, to finalize a gun crime response and evidence processing protocol. At the time, Honduras had the highest murder rate in the world, with crime and violence being severe problems and most serious crimes left unsolved.
[NOTE: I’ll discuss the back story about Figure 1 above at the end]
The meeting addressed investigative and prosecutorial gaps between the National Police and the Ministerio Publico Fiscalia (Prosecutor's Office), which had developed over years due to institutional challenges. The goal was to ensure efficient sharing of ballistics data using Honduras’s newly acquired IBIS technology. However, IBIS alone was insufficient—it needed proper processes and committed personnel to be effective.
The workshop participants finalized the draft protocols for collecting and processing fired evidence and test fires from seized firearms. A significant improvement from previous efforts was assigning responsibilities and setting deadlines to hold individuals accountable—potentially forming a fourth leg of the "IBIS stool" for greater stability.
Before concluding, attendees were asked to share their thoughts on the next steps to ensure follow-through on their commitments. Around the table the response was the same - Stop the impunity!
I was surprised and enlightened to the much deeper issues related to those three short words.
According to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, impunity is a noun that means freedom or exemption from punishment, loss, or harm. The word can apply to the most advantaged and the least.
Moreover, somewhere on the scale between the privileged and the itinerant are the criminally ruthless and fearless.
There are some places in the world today where criminally ruthless and fearless gangs like MS-13 and equally violent drug cartels operate with practical impunity. In some countries, police, prosecutors, and judges live under the continual temptation of bribes and threats of harm and worse if they refuse. Additionally, forensic experts are reluctant to render opinions on inculpatory evidence for fear of retribution and harm.
As a former US law enforcer, I was embarrassed at my naiveté. I was well aware that sometimes a criminal will find a way to beat the system, and a prosecutor may decline a case that I believed merited indictment. I could not, however, imagine a situation in which 25 of my colleagues would identify “stop the impunity” as the overarching goal of a national program.
Where did these transnational gangs or “maras” come from and when?
Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau, Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs, extensively researched transnational gangs, particularly those originating from Central America in the 1980s.1 He explains that these gangs, known as maras, emerged due to conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, leading to mass migrations to the U.S., particularly Los Angeles. Many young men, familiar with armed combat, found themselves in a difficult social and economic environment dominated by existing gangs such as the Crips, Bloods, and the Mexican Mafia (EME). Some joined the 18th Street Gang (M-18), the Salvadorians formed the rival gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Maras that were heavily involved in criminal activities, were arrested and later deported to their home countries where they strengthened their operations across Central America, becoming skilled transnational entities. Their ability to move across borders allows them to evade law enforcement and coordinate their criminal activities internationally.
Bruneau highlighted the national security threats posed by these gangs:
They overwhelm governments with their violence and numbers.
They act as alternate authorities, imposing taxes and controlling territories.
They infiltrate police forces and NGOs, potentially aligning with political groups.
They possess the capability to smuggle terrorists and weapons across borders.
Bruneau concluded that a collaborative international effort is essential, calling for improved intelligence sharing and coordinated strategies to combat the growing influence of these violent organizations.
Power Derived from the Barrel of a Gun
A striking example of gang violence crossing national borders is reported in a 2005 Foreign Affairs article by journalist Ana Arana.2 She describes a brutal attack in Chamalecon, Honduras, where gunmen, later identified as members of the MS-13 gang, stopped a bus and opened fire with AK-47s, killing 28 passengers. The victims were chosen at random, with the massacre serving as a protest and warning against the government's crackdown on gang activities. The mastermind behind the attack, Ebner Anibal Rivera-Paz, was later arrested in Falfurrias, Texas.
In 2012, I wrote a paper entitled: Transnational organized crime and gun violence: A case for firearm forensic intelligence sharing, published in an International Review.3
In researching my 2012 paper, I came across a 2008, Department of Justice publication entitled: Overview of the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime.4
While reviewing my 2012 paper for this Substack article, I was surprised to find how relevant the 2008 DOJ strategy for combating organized crime remains today, despite its age. It states that international organized criminals have evolved toward looser network structures and away from traditional hierarchical structures. Every day, we read and listen to reports about the myriad types of violent criminal groups impacting our communities. Just for clarity, a degree of structure remains, “shotcallers” are the ones who still call the shots.
Even more disturbing than their sheer numbers, the gangs of today seem determined to use extreme violence for even what we perceive are the most trivial of reasons.
In my opinion, the 2008 Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, remains relevant. It establishes an investigation and prosecution framework that emphasizes four priority areas of action against international organized crime (IOC):
► MARSHAL INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE:
Collect, synthesize and disseminate timely information and intelligence from multiple sources. Firearms, hold and discharge data of tactical and strategic intelligence value. They have manufacturers identifying information that can be used to trace the gun’s history of transactions. Moreover, they may hold latent fingerprints, DNA and trace evidence. The fired ammunition components that a gun discharges, hold certain identifiable markings transferred to them as they come in contact with the internal working parts of the gun. Tools exist that can manage all of this data.
For example:
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) and the ATF National Tracing Center (NTC) and eTrace are two tools, unique to ATF, that our nation’s Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) rely upon to develop evidence-led actionable intelligence on repetitive criminal shooters, local and internationally based gangs, and cartels, and their sources of crime guns.
NIBIN generates a new investigative lead every 2.4 minutes, empowering Law Enforcement with real-time intelligence to solve gun-related crimes faster. Over NIBIN’s 26-year history, more than 1 million investigative leads have been provided to LEAs nationwide.
The eTrace application and NIBIN are critical parts of ATF’s Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) operations. CGICs are multiagency law enforcement collaborations focused on stopping gun crimes by collecting, analyzing, and distributing intelligence reports about crime guns, mass shootings, and major incidents across jurisdictions.
The IBIN (INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network) helps law enforcement link gun-related crimes across vast distances by sharing and comparing ballistic data.
► PRIORITIZE & TARGET THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IOC THREATS:
Select and target the international gang and cartel figures and organizations that pose the greatest threat to the United States and ensure the national coordination of investigations and prosecutions involving these targets.
For example:
Gangs with a discernable record of operating with impunity within a country:
International gangs (e.g. Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), 18th Street Gang, Tren de Aragua)
Cartels (e.g. Mexico’s Drug Cartels)
► ATTACK FROM ALL ANGLES:
Employ all available law enforcement and non-law enforcement tools – including drawing upon the unique expertise of every participating U.S. law enforcement agency in domestic operations, partnering with foreign counterparts to pursue cases at home and abroad, and employing U.S. government sanctions and advisories – all in a crosscutting effort to disrupt IOC activity.
For example:
In 2017, The Major City Chiefs Association and the National Policing Institute issued a report entitled: Reducing Violent Crime in American Cities: An Opportunity to Lead, which provided information on federal law enforcement agency programs and tools that have assisted them in dealing with violent crime. They identified ATF’s NIBIN, the NTC and eTrace to be the most useful tools in preventing firearm-related violence through the expedited identification and arrest of criminal shooters and gun traffickers.
The IBIN (INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network) helps law enforcement link gun-related crimes across vast distances by sharing and comparing ballistic data. Member countries are urged to follow the IBIN Search Protocol, particularly for cases near international borders, involving suspected traffickers, terrorism, or individuals with foreign residences. Using IBIS® technology, IBIN captures and analyzes digital images of microscopic markings on fired bullets and cartridge cases. This enables forensic experts to identify potential matches, linking crimes and suspects more efficiently. Non-IBIN member countries can access the system through INTERPOL by coordinating with their National Central Bureau. Currently, IBIN has 37 operational member countries with access to over 2 million crime-related ballistic data records.
The INTERPOL iARMS database is used by law enforcement to record and trace illicit firearms. iARMS contains over 1.5 million records that help identify firearms trafficking patterns and smuggling routes. Moreover, iARMS plays a role in disrupting illicit arms networks and supporting law enforcement globally.
► ENTERPRISE THEORY:
Develop aggressive strategies for dismantling entire criminal organizations, especially their leadership, by using proactive investigative techniques and multi-layered prosecutions.
For example:
“Field Operations Support Programs" can be designed to provide assistance and logistical support to enforcement teams working in areas of transnational gang/cartel activity, including training, technical and legal assistance, communication systems, forensic and data management tools, and resource allocation, allowing the field teams to efficiently perform their tasks and meet their operational goals to stop the impunity and nip it in the bud before it takes hold.
RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS
“When the criminals operate in multiple countries throughout the world, we must cast as wide a net as possible to catch those valuable pieces of information that will allow us to identify and apprehend those responsible. This is our best defense against transnational illicit networks, whether they are involved in armed robbery, drug trafficking, terrorism, human smuggling or any other crime.” Ronald K. Noble, former INTERPOL Secretary General
1. Consider the creation and deployment of targeted transnational gang/cartel “Field Operations Support Programs" designed to provide assistance and logistical support to enforcement teams working in areas of transnational gang/cartel activity, including training, technical and legal assistance, communication systems, forensic and data management tools, and resource allocation, allowing the field teams to efficiently perform their tasks and meet their operational goals to stop the impunity and nip it in the bud before it takes hold.
2. Ensure that all US federal law enforcement agencies engaged in the removal of transnational and cartel associates illegally in this county are tracing all seized crime guns through ATF eTrace and test firing them for processing through ATF’s NIBIN network along with recovered fired evidence.
3. Deploy NIBIN systems more broadly across the country to support the federal, state, and local agencies involved in enforcement operations involving transnational gangs/cartels, and adequately fund and staff these efforts to expedite data entry and ballistic evidence processing.
4. Increase NIBIN correlation capacity at the NIBIN National Correlation and Training Centers (NNCTC) in Huntsville and Wichita to help analyze NIBIN data more efficiently and disseminate actionable intelligence and investigative leads to the field enforcement teams as quickly as possible.
5. Establish more ATF Crime Gun Intelligence Centers (CGICs), increasing law enforcement access to NIBIN, eTrace, local police data, and data from the other anti-crime related systems in operation in the affected area.
6. Deploy automated data analysis software to generate more timely tactical and strategic intelligence linked to transnational gangs/cartels.
7. Explore avenues for sharing NIBIN data with Mexico and INTERPOL’s IBIN to support transnational gang/cartel-related investigations.
END NOTE:
The story behind the photo in figure 1 above: After the workshop that day, a colleague and I stepped outside our hotel to catch a cab to the Honduras National Police Casamata (HQ) station. It was midday in the business district, not far from the Presidential Palace and it was busy. As we made our way to the curb, we noticed a large crowd gathering down the street—word quickly spread that a shooting had just occurred.
According to bystanders, a motorcycle had pulled up next to a white pickup truck stopped in traffic, and the passenger on the bike unleashed a burst of machine gun fire, killing the truck’s driver where he sat. The suspects then sped away on the motorcycle.
Curious, we walked toward the scene, and I instinctively pulled out my iPhone to capture the moment. It wasn’t long before I realized the absurdity of the situation—people get killed for their cell phones even in the U.S., and there I was, standing in a crowd in a country that many referred to as the most violent place on earth, taking pictures with my iPhone. Recognizing the risk, I stashed the phone and my colleague and I quickly retreated to safer ground at the hotel.
Our cab arrived and we headed to our appointment at the National Police Headquarters. Traffic around the hotel was at a standstill, likely due to the aftermath of the shooting. Our cab driver found an alternate route behind the hotel, weaving through side streets. Just a few blocks away from the crime scene, we came across a motorcycle lying on its side in the street, surrounded by a small crowd. A dazed man, his hands on his head, sat on the curb next to the fallen bike.
My questioning instincts kicked in—What if the assassins had crashed in their haste to flee the nearby murder scene? As our cab continued forward, I turned and glanced out the back window. I saw two or three people lifting the bike trying to wheel it away. I was about to ask the cabby to follow them, when I remembered that: I wasn’t a cop anymore.
Stop the impunity where it exists – better yet - Stop the impunity before it starts
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Thomas C. Bruneau, The Maras and National Security in Central America, Strategic Insights [Journal], Volume IV, Issue 5, May 2005
Ana Arana. How the Street Gangs Took Central America, Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2005. Vol. 84, Iss. 3; pg. 98
Gagliardi, P. (2012). Transnational organized crime and gun violence. A case for firearm forensic intelligence sharing. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 26(1), 83–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2012.646801
U.S. Department of Justice, Overview of the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, April 2008. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/04/23/ioc-strategy-public-overview.pdf
Great article, Pete!